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Abstract
In this paper, we axiomatize the deontic logic in Fusco 2015, which uses a
Stalnaker-inspired account of diagonal acceptance and a two-dimensional ac-
count of disjunction to treat Ross’s Paradox and the Puzzle of Free Choice Per-
mission. On this account, disjunction-involving validities are a priori rather
than necessary. We show how to axiomatize two-dimensional disjunction so
that the introduction/elimination rules for boolean disjunction can be viewed
as one-dimensional projections of more general two-dimensional rules. These
completeness results help make explicit the restrictions Fusco’s account must
place on free-choice inferences. They are also of independent interest, as
they raise difficult questions about how to ‘lift’ a Kripke frame for a one-
dimensional modal logic into two dimensions.
1 Introduction
The validity of or -introduction seems to be a basic rule of natural language
disjunction: from φ, one may infer φ or ψ.
Or-Intro. φ ( (φ or ψ)
Yet the rule apparently fails in the scope of deontic modals. For example, the
nonentailment known as Ross’s Puzzle illustrates the failure of Or-Intro in the
scope of ‘ought’ (henceforth O) (Ross, 1941):
Ross’s Puzzle. Oφ * O(φ or ψ)
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As an illustration, observe that (1-a), famously, does not seem to entail (1-b):
(1) a. You ought to post the letter.
b. You ought to post the letter or burn it.
Similarly, Or-Intro does not seem valid in the scope of ‘may’ (henceforth M). For
instance, (2-a) does not seem to entail (2-b):
(2) a. You may post the letter.
b. You may post the letter or burn it.
An attractive explanation for this is that (2-b) seems to entail that both disjuncts
are permissible—an observation known as Free Choice Permission (Kamp, 1973):
FCP. M(φ or ψ) ( Mφ ^Mψ
For example, the inference from (3-a) to (3-b) and (3-c) seems valid:
(3) a. You may have an apple or a pear.
b. You may have an apple.
c. You may have a pear.
This would explain why (2-a) doesn’t entail (2-b): if it did, then (2-a) would entail
you may burn the letter, which is not the case!1
It is well-known that Ross’s Puzzle and FCP cause trouble for standard deontic
logic, which interprets O as a normal modal operator, with M as its dual. As
a consequence, these operators are monotonic: if φ entails ψ, then Oφ entails
Oψ, and Mφ entails Mψ. This means that standard deontic logic predicts that
(i) Oφ entails O(φ or ψ) and Mφ entails M(φ or ψ), and (ii) if FCP holds, then
Mφ entails Mψ for any φ and ψ. These predictions reveal a deep problem at the
foundations of standard deontic logic.
Ross’s Puzzle is problematic for any deontic logic that validates two key prin-
ciples:
Necessitation. If ( φ, then ( Oφ
K Axiom. ( O(φÑ ψ)Ñ (OφÑ Oψ)
1Note that while (3-a) seems to entail (3-b) and (3-c), it resoundingly fails to entail (i):
(i) You may have an apple and a pear.
This additional datum is sometimes called ‘exclusivity’.
EX. M(φ or ψ) * M(φ ^ ψ)
See, inter alia, Simons 2005, Fox 2007, and Barker 2010. See also Fusco 2020a for empirical work on
the nature of this exclusivity.
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Fromtheseprinciples (togetherwith classical logic),we canderiveOφÑO(φ or ψ).
Here is the proof:
1. φÑ (φ or ψ) Or-Intro
2. O(φÑ (φ or ψ)) Necessitation, 1
3. O(φÑ (φ or ψ))Ñ (OφÑ O(φ or ψ)) K Axiom
4. OφÑ O(φ or ψ) modus ponens, 2, 3
Thus, if one wishes to capture Ross’s Puzzle in a deontic logic, one seems com-
mitted either to rejecting Necessitation or rejecting the K Axiom. But which is the
culprit, and why?
Fusco (2015) suggests that the culprit is Necessitation. To seewhy, let’s consider
why the inference from (1-a) to (1-b) seems bad. One reason it seems bad to say
you ought to post the letter or burn it is that this seems to imply that both disjuncts
are permissible. The following inference pattern—Free Choice Obligation—seems
intuitively valid:
FCO. O(φ or ψ) ( Mφ ^Mψ
Thus, to illustrate, (4-a) seems to entail (4-b) and (4-c):
(4) a. You ought to either do the dishes or take out the trash.
b. You may do the dishes.
c. You may take out the trash.
Moreover, FCO follows from FCP together with a relatively plausible principle
relating ‘ought’ and ‘may’:
Ought Implies May. Oφ ( Mφ
But if FCOholds, thenalreadyNecessitation is enough towreakhavoc: Necessitation
plus FCO entail that everything is permissible:2
1. (φ or ¬φ) tautology
2. O(φ or ¬φ) Necessitation, 1
3. Mφ ^M¬φ FCO, 2
This provides one motivation for thinking that the way forward for deontic logic
is to reject Necessitation.
Two-dimensional semantics offers an elegant way of developing Necessitation-
free modal logics: while (5-a) below is “necessary” in the sense of being knowable
a priori, it is not metaphysically necessary, in that things could have been dif-
ferent from how they actually are (Crossley and Humberstone, 1977; Davies and
Humberstone, 1980; Kaplan, 1989).
2Note it does not help here to restrict FCO to φ and ψ that are possible; that still would imply
that for any contingent φ is permissible.
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(5) a. Everything is as it actually is.
b. Necessarily, everything is as it actually is.
Perhaps, then, the key to solving these puzzles is to move to a two-dimensional
framework. This is the strategy pursued by Fusco (2015).
The main idea behind Fusco’s semantics is to introduce a two-dimensional
entry for ‘ or ’ on which it behaves classically in unembedded contexts but non-
classically under the scope of deontic modals. However, while this semantics
captures Ross’s Puzzle and FCP, there still remains a further question regarding
what the complete logic of her semantics is.
In this paper, we answer this question. We show how to axiomatize the
logic of two-dimensional disjunction so that the introduction/elimination rules
for boolean disjunction can be viewed as one-dimensional projections of more
general rules. In addition, we prove several soundness and completeness results
for two-dimensional deontic logics, which help make explicit the background
assumptions and scope of Fusco’s account.
We take these completeness results to be of independent interest, as they raise
interesting questions about how to “lift” a Kripke frame for a one-dimensional
modal logic into two dimensions. These issues arise especially in the context of the
picture of communication from Stalnaker 1978, where diagonalization plays a key
role. Inparticular, two-dimensionalizingdeontic logic in a Stalnakerian framework
seems to require an interesting and substantive metaphysical assumption about
the nature of deontic accessibility, viz., thatwhichworlds are deontically accessible
does not vary from world-to-world.3
Here is a brief outline. In § 2, we review the philosophical motivations, formal
semantics, and logic of standard two-dimensionalism. In § 3, we present Fusco’s
two-dimensional semantics for disjunction and articulate different ways to axiom-
atize the logic of disjunction prior to adding deontic modals. In § 4, we extend
two-dimensionalism with deontic modals and show how doing so can capture
both Ross’s Puzzle and FCP. The details of the completeness proofs are given in
the technical appendices.
2 A Crash Course in Two-Dimensionalism
2.1 Two Notions of Necessity and Two Notions of Consequence
In two-dimensional semantics, the truth of a well-formed formula φ in a model
M is relativized to two parameters. The first, the world-as-actual, plays a role in
3This bears resemblance to a point made by Hawthorne and Magidor (2009) about epistemic
accessibility.
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determining the propositional content expressed by φ.4 The second, the world of
evaluation, plays the role of the world in which that proposition’s truth-value is
interrogated; it is also the only parameter shifted by the standard modal operators◻ and ◇. Two basic two-dimensional operators, @ (usually glossed as ‘actually’)
and :, can be added alongside ◻ and ◇:5
(◻) y , x , ◻φ iff for all x1: y , x1 , φ
(@) y , x , @φ iff y , y , φ
(:) y , x , :φ iff x , x , φ
One motivation for moving to a two-dimensional framework is the fact that
we can regiment several philosophically important distinctions in a unified way
(Davies and Humberstone, 1980). To illustrate, recall (5-a) and (5-b) from § 1:
(5) a. Everything is as it actually is.
b. Necessarily, everything is as it actually is.
We observed that while (5-a) seems to be a logical truth, it does not seem to be
necessarily true, i.e., (5-b) seems false. The problem is that we cannot accept
(5-a) as a logical truth in a normal modal logic while denying (5-b). Let ’ stand
for pEverything is as it actually isq.6 In the two-dimensional framework, we can
analyze this sentence as follows:7
(’) y , x ,’ iff y  x
Then we have the following argument for (5-b):
1. ’ is a logical truth
2. Necessitation holds, i.e., if φ is a logical truth, then so is ◻φ.
3. ◻ ’ is a logical truth.
4We follow the literature here in defining a proposition to be a function from worlds to truth-
values.
5Technically, the satisfaction relation , should always be relativized to a model M. In our
informal exposition, however, we will often drop mention of the model for readability.
6For similar sentential constants, compare (for “floating” actuality) ‘I’ fromHumberstone (2004,
pg. 54), and (for “anchored” actuality) the constant ‘n’ in Meredith and Prior (1965). In a language
with propositional quantifiers and @, we could express ’ as ∀p(@pÑ p).
7These truth conditions ignore complications that arise when x and y are qualitative duplicate
worlds. We set this complication aside.
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If we want to deny the conclusion, we need to reject one of the premises. But
which?
Two-dimensionalism provides us with an elegant answer: which premise you
should give up depends on your notion of consequence. First, let us say an
argument is strictly valid just in case it preserves truth over all points of evaluation,
i.e., all pairs of worlds 〈y , x〉. Strict validity captures the thought that a valid
argument is meant to preserve truth in every possible scenario. On this notion
of logical consequence, Necessitation still holds: if φ is true at every point of
evaluation 〈y , x〉, then so is ◻φ. However, the first premise of the argument for
(5-b) is false, since there are non-diagonal points where the x- and y-coordinates
do not agree on what is the case—that is, whatever world is actual, it still could
have been that things were different from how they actually are. Since ’ only
holds on diagonal points, it is not a strict logical truth.
However, ’ does hold on all diagonal points. An argument is diagonally valid
just in case it preserves truth over all diagonal points, i.e., all pairs of the form
〈z , z〉. This captures the thought that a valid argument is meant to preserve truth
no matter which world is actual. On this notion of logical consequence, the first
premise of the argument for (5-b) is true, but the second premise is false—e.g., ’
is diagonally valid, but ◻ ’ is not. In general, whenever something is diagonally
but not strictly valid, we’ll have a counterexample to Necessitation.
Quantification over diagonal points also allows one to represent the difference
betweenmetaphysical necessity and a priority in a two-dimensional framework. This
is just the difference between φ’s being “horizontally” valid, i.e., holding every-
where along the x-axis, and φ’s being diagonally valid.8 That is, fixing y as the
actual world, φ is metaphysically necessary iff it holds at 〈y , x〉 for all x, whereas
φ is a priori iff it holds at 〈z , z〉 for all z.9 The latter notion can be represented
by introducing a new defined operator for a priori truth: Aφ B ◻:φ. It is easy to
check that A has the following truth conditions:
(A) y , x , Aφ iff for all z: z , z , φ.
While ’ (‘everything is as it actually is’) is not metaphysically necessary, it is a
priori: that is, A ’ is a strict logical truth. In fact, even though Necessitation does
not hold for diagonal validity, the following variant of Necessitation does:
A Priorization. If ( φ, then ( Aφ.
That is: if φ is a diagonal logical truth, then so is Aφ. Strict validity is a formaliza-
tion of necessary entailment, while diagonal validity is a formalization of a priori
entailment.
8See Davies and Humberstone 1980; Kaplan 1989. For classic examples where metaphysical
necessity comes apart from a priority, see Kripke 1980; Kaplan 1989.
9This idea can be found, inter alia, in van Fraassen (1977) and Lewis (1973, §2.8), who in turn
cites Kamp (1971) and Vlach (1973). See also Chalmers (2004).
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2.2 Stalnaker’s Two Dimensionalism
Another classic application of two-dimensionalism, which will provide us with a
metalanguage (rather than object language) gloss onA, comes fromStalnaker 1978.
There, Stalnaker uses two-dimensionalism tomodel conversations inwhich speak-
ers informatively assert sentenceswhosepropositional content is under threat from
indeterminacy. To clarify the problem, he introduces the notion of a context set: a
set of possibileworlds left open bywhat is accepted in commonby the interlocutors
of a conversation. Conversational update on an assertion of φ is a quasi-Bayesian
procedure which aims to eliminate from the context set any worlds which are
incompatible with φ’s content.
Suppose, however, that it is unknown—or perhaps, in the case of the open
future, evenmetaphysically indeterminate—whichworld is actual. Then therewill
be cases inwhich it is unknownor indeterminatewhat the content of an assertion of
φ is, and thus unclearwhichworlds should be “thrown out” of the context set if the
assertion is to be accepted. Stalnaker’s flagship example involves the word ‘you’ in
the asserted sentence pYou are a foolq (pg. 81). If it is unknown, or indeterminate,
who the addressee of the context is, it will be unknown, or indeterminate, which
person is being claimed to be a fool, and so it will be unknown or indeterminate
which update is being proposed.
Following Stalnaker, we can visualize the situation using two-dimensional ma-
trices. In these matrices, the rows represent the world-as-actual (y-coordinate)—a
role which contributes to determining the proposition expressed by a sentence
(e.g., determining the referent of ‘you’)—while the columns represent the world
of evaluation (x-coordinate), where the content, once determined, is assessed. If
the content of a sentence depends on which world is actual, then the rows of the
matrix will not be identical.
So to use Stalnaker’s example, suppose the speaker is addressing O’Leary in
worlds i and j and to Daniels in world k, and moreover O’Leary is a fool in worlds
i and k but not in world j, whereas Daniels is a fool only in j. In that case, we can
represent the distribution of truth values of pYou are a foolq as in Figure 1. For
instance, the cell on row i and column j contains the truth value of pYou are a foolq
at the point 〈i , j〉, which is true iff the person that the speaker is addressing in
world i is a fool in world j. Since at world i, the speaker is addressing O’Leary,
and since O’Leary is not a fool at world j, pYou are a foolq is false at 〈i , j〉.
Whichworlds need to be thrown out of the context set upon accepting an assertion
of pYou are a foolq depends on which world is actual: if i or j is actual, we throw
out j; if k is actual, we throw out i and k. But—to reiterate the problem Stalnaker is
raising—which world is actual is exactly what is either unknown or indeterminate
in context (op. cit., pg. 90).
In such a predicament, Stalnaker proposes that a sentence φ can be rationally
(re)interpreted as :φ. As Stalnaker puts it, this move, called diagonalization,
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i j k
i T F T
j T F T
k F T F
pYou are a foolq
Figure 1: A two-dimensional matrix for pYou are a foolq (Stalnaker, 1978, pg. 81).
interprets φ as something like “what φ says is true”, where “what φ says” is the
proposition expressed by φ given a world as actual (pg. 82).10 This is visualized in
Figure 2. Diagonalization restores a uniformity condition to matrices: the same
proposition is expressed relative to each candidate for actuality.11 In a scenario
illustrated by Figure 1, updating the context set with the diagonalized assertion
amounts to eliminating worlds j and k from the context set.
i j k
i T F T
j T F T
k F T F
pYou are a foolq
i j k
i T F F
j T F F
k T F F
p:You are a foolq
Figure 2: Visualizing diagonalization using matrices.
Stalnaker’s theory of assertion reveals a further distinction in the notion of
logical consequence worth highlighting. In § 2.1, we introduced a classical notion
of consequence, which defines validity in terms of preservation of truth: an argu-
ment is valid in this sense if the conclusion is true at any point of evaluation where
the premises are true. But there is also an informational notion of consequence,
which defines validity in terms of preservation of acceptance. An argument is valid
in this sense if the conclusion is accepted at any context set where the premises
are accepted.12 In a static one-dimensional framework, acceptance can be mod-
10For a suggestion that diagonalization can also occur in the scope of attitude verbs like ‘believes’,
see Stalnaker (1981).
11In the literature, Hawthorne and Magidor (2009) object that diagonalization does not restore
uniformity unless certain tendentious conditions on knowledge are met: namely, that the same
worlds horizontally accessible on each row. We bracket this concern here, particularly because our
discussion is applicable to nonepistemic as well as epistemic indeterminacy.
12For more on this notion, see Stalnaker 1975’s notion of reasonable inference, as well as, inter
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eled as global truth, i.e., truth relative to every world in a context set. Thus, Γ
informationally entails φ whenever ◻Γ B {◻γ | γ P Γ} classically entails ◻φ.13
Γ classically entails φ B ∀x : (x , Γ ñ x , φ)
Γ informationally entails φ B (∀x : x , Γ) ñ (∀x : x , φ)
But what about diagonalization? In Stalnaker’s two-dimensional framework,
diagonalization may occur before acceptance into the common ground.14 Hence
there is a strict-diagonal distinction to be had at the level of informational conse-
quence as well as classical consequence. Informational strict consequence can be
glossed like this: no matter which world is actual, if the content of the premises
were accepted, so would the content of the conclusion. Stated in terms of classi-
cal strict entailment: Γ informationally strictly entails φ whenever ◻Γ classically
strictly entails ◻φ. Informational diagonal consequence, by contrast, can be
glossed like this: if the diagonalized content of the premises are accepted, then
so is the diagonalized content of the conclusion. Stated in terms of classical strict
entailment: Γ informationally diagonally entails φ whenever ◻:Γ B {◻:γ | γ P Γ}
classically strictly entails ◻:φ.
Because A B ◻: can be seen as a priority of the relevant, contextually-situated
kind, we will also call informational diagonal consequence a priori consequence,
which we will write as ‘▷’. This notion of consequence matches more closely with
the preservation of acceptance in Stalnaker’s framework. Moreover, it is a priori
consequence which will be key to both validating FCP and blocking Ross’s Puzzle
on Fusco’s semantics: it is a notion of consequence that is just weak enough to
validate the former but not the latter.15
Thus, we have four notions of consequence—varying along two dimensions,
alia, Veltman 1996; Yalcin 2007; Bledin 2015.
13The difference between classical and informational consequence mirrors the distinction be-
tween local and global consequence that one finds in the literature on modal logic (Blackburn et al.,
2002). For unarticulated ‘boxlike’ modalities in natural language, it is worth noting Kratzer’s
influential proposal that bare indicative conditionals contain a covert necessity operator in the
consequent Kratzer (1981, 1986).
14Indeed, Heim (2004, §9) suggests always diagonalizing, noting that diagonalization is super-
fluous if uniformity is already satisfied.
15One may object that a priori consequence is an odd notion of consequence to validate
FCP in, since it validates the inference from p to Ap. It is important to bear in mind,
however, that we are using the term “a priori” in a context-specific sense. In this sense,
φ is a priori if, given the current conversational context, it is commonly accepted that φ,
where common acceptance is cashed out recursively (everyone in the conversation accepts it,
and everyone accepts that everyone excepts it, etc.). Thus, Aφ means something more like
pit is a priori that φ given what is commonly accepted in the current conversationq. On that un-
derstanding, the inference from p to Ap is not surprising: if the speakers all commonly accept p,
then they commonly accept that they commonly accept p.
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strict vs. diagonal and classical vs. informational—illustrated in Figure 3.16 A
priori consequence occupies the lower right-hand side of the relevant space of
possibilities.
classical informational
strict Γ ( φ ◻Γ ( ◻φ
diagonal :Γ ( :φ ◻:Γ ( ◻:φ
Γ ▷ φ
Figure 3: Different notions of consequence summarized.
2.3 Axiomatization of Two-Dimensional Semantics
One of our primary goals in this paper is to give an axiomatization of Fusco’s two-
dimensional extension of deontic logic. So we should first review axiomatizations
for ordinary two-dimensional logic before extending them with deontic modals.
We give axiomatizations of classical strict consequence, as the other notions of
consequence can be defined in terms of classical strict consequence using : and ◻
(as in Figure 3).
Definition 1. Given a set Prop  {p1, p2, p3, . . . } of proposition letters, the basic
two-dimensional language L2D is defined recursively in Backus-Naur form as
follows:
φ F Prop | ¬φ | (φ ^ φ) | ◻φ | @φ | :φ.
◇, _,Ñ andØ defined as usual; in particular, note that (φ _ ψ) B ¬(¬φ ^ ¬ψ).
We also define Aφ (it is a priori that φ) as ◻:φ.
Definition 2. A basic matrix frame is a Kripke frame 〈W ˆW, R◻, R@, R:〉, where
W ,  and:
• 〈y , x〉R◻〈y1, x1〉 iff y  y1
16Note that in the two-dimensional setting, informational strict consequence does not align neatly
with global strict consequence. Global consequence is usually defined in terms of points of evalu-
ation: an argument is globally valid if its conclusion holds at every point of evaluation whenever
its premises hold at every point of evaluation. Stated in terms of classical (i.e., local) strict en-
tailment: Γ globally strictly entails φ whenever ◻:◻Γ B {◻:◻γ | γ P Γ} classically strictly entails◻:◻φ. This is not the same as informational strict consequence, since the world-as-actual is held
fixed from premises to conclusion. Thus, informational strict consequence is stronger than global
strict consequence. On the other hand, informational diagonal consequence and global diagonal
consequence do coincide.
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• 〈y , x〉R@〈y1, x1〉 iff y1  x1  y.
• 〈y , x〉R:〈y1, x1〉 iff y1  x1  x.
LetM be the class of basic matrix frames. A basic matrix model is a pair of a basic
matrix frame 〈W ˆW, R◻, R@, R:〉 and a valuation function V : PropÑ ℘(W ˆW).
We define the satisfaction relation , between a pointed matrix modelM , y , x
and a L2D-formula φ in the usual manner for the Kripke semantics. Where Γ is
a set of formulas, we’ll write M , y , x , Γ to mean that M , y , x , γ for all γ P Γ.
Finally, we define classical strict consequence: where Γ is a set of L2D-formulas
and φ is a L2D-formula, Γ (2D φ iff for all pointed basic matrix modelsM , y , x, if
M , y , x , Γ, thenM , y , x , φ.
Definition 3. Let 2D be the Hilbert-style proof system consisting of the following
axioms and rules: (i) all propositional tautologies as axioms; (ii) the rules of
Modus Ponens and Uniform Substitution; (iii) the K Axiom and Necessitation for











We write Γ $2D φ if for some γ1, . . . , γn P Γ, the formula (γ1 ^ ¨ ¨ ¨ ^ γn)Ñ φ is
derivable in 2D.
The following is proven in Fusco 2020b.
Theorem 1. 2D is sound and complete for classical strict consequence overM.
A priori consequence can then just be defined in terms of classical strict conse-
quence: Γ ▷2D φ iff for some γ1, . . . , γn P Γ: $2D (Aγ1 ^ ¨ ¨ ¨ ^ Aγn)Ñ Aφ.
2.4 Åqvist logic
The matrix semantics given above is more general than the usual presentation of
two-dimensionalism in at least one respect: we allowatomics to represent arbitrary
matrices like the one provided for pYou are a foolq, whose content varies with the
world-as-actual.
By contrast, according to one common strand of two-dimensionalism, valuation
functions interpret atomics as sets of worlds, not sets of pairs of worlds. This means
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the truth of atomics never depends on the world-as-actual parameter. These
“standard” truth conditions build in the requirement that the atomics are reserved
for sentences that satisfy the Stalnakerian uniformity condition introduced in § 2.2,
i.e., that 〈y , x〉 P V(p) iff 〈y1, x〉 P V(p) for any x , y , y1. For these sentences,
necessity and a priority coincide.17
It is natural to ask how imposing this restriction on the valuations of atomics
affects the logic given in § 2.3. We call such logics Åqvist logics (Åqvist, 1973;
Segerberg, 1973). It turns out that their distinguishing axiom is Å:
Å αØ :α for any atomic α (Segerberg, 1973, pg. 95)
In terms ofmatrices,Å says that rows of thematrix of an atomicmust be duplicates,
i.e., each column must either be a column of Ts or a column of Fs.
Definition 4. Amatrix model 〈W ˆW, R◻, R@, R:,V〉 is Åqvist iff for all x , y , y1 P
W :
〈y , x〉 P V(p) ô 〈y1, x〉 P V(p).
LetMÅ be the class of Åqvist matrix models.
Note that we can define an “Åqvist operator” Å which applies to a formula φ
iff φ’s truth is insensitive to the world-as-actual parameter, i.e., iff it is interpreted
the same way on every row:
Åφ B ◻:◻(φØ :φ)
Then we could reformulate Å as the axiom schema Åα for any atomic α. The Å
operator turns out to be important for Fusco’s explanation of FCP, as the inference
only holds in her semantics for φ and ψ that have this “uniformity” feature.
As Segerberg is at pains to emphasize, an Åqvist logic is not, in general, closed
under uniform substitution.18 Rather, it is closed only under substitution within
the 1D fragment of the language.19 Thus, in order to axiomatize Åqvist logics, we
need to formulate proof systems that are not closed under Uniform Substitution,
but still allow Uniform Substitution when no appeal to Å has been made. This is
achieved as follows:
17One can compare here the PQTI sentences of Chalmers (2012).
18For discussion, see, inter alia, Smiley 1982; Holliday et al. 2013.
19This limitation on closure under substitution follows the spirit of, e.g., Williamson (2013),
who remarks that “the obvious rationale for insisting on . . . closure. . . under uniform substitution
in a propositional system is a reading of non-logical sentence letters as propositional variables”
(Williamson, 2013, pg. 76, emphasis added; see also Burgess, 1999, pg. 176). Similarly, in a 2D
framework Gregory (2001) remarks that “Goodmodal [arguments]—at least one variety—are ones
which are informally sound...[meaning that] for any interpretation ofL, the propositions assigned to
[the premises] entail the proposition assigned to [the conclusion] (op. cit., pg. 58, emphasis added).
This restriction on closure will exclude arbitrary dipropositions, like ’ and the (undiagonalized)
pYou are a foolq, from the relevant standard of good argument.
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Definition 5. Let 2DÅ be the Hilbert-style proof system consisting of Modus
Ponens, Necessitation for each primitivemodal operator,Å, and the axiom schema:
2D φ, where φ is a theorem of 2D.
In 2DÅ, we can appeal to Uniform substitution in deriving an ordinary theorem
of 2D. But once we start reasoning with the consequences of Å, we are no longer
allowed to appeal to Uniform Substitution andmust instead rely on the other rules
and axioms. The following is proven in Fusco 2020b:
Theorem 2. 2DÅ is sound and complete for strict classical consequence overMÅ.
3 Two-Dimensional Disjunction
3.1 An Actuality-sensitive Semantics for Disjunction
We now return to Fusco’s strategy for solving the deontic puzzles sketched in § 1.
According to this two-dimensional strategy, what we need for Ross’s Puzzle and
FCP is a semantics for disjunction where Or-Intro is a priori, but not necessary. In
this section, we review Fusco’s proposal and explain how an axiomatization for the
basic two-dimensional language can be extended to include her two-dimensional
disjunction.
This semantics is motivated by Groenendĳk and Stokhof (1982) and Lewis
(1982)’s two-dimensional approach to “whether p or q” attitude ascriptions, as in
(6) Bob knows [whether [p or q]].
(7) Bob doesn’t know [whether [p or q]].
The insight here is that (6) and (7) credit Bob with knowledge and ignorance,
respectively, of the actually true answer to the question pp, or q?q. According to
Groenendĳk & Stokhof and Lewis, pwhether p or qq is a two-dimensional propo-
sitional concept, which expresses the proposition that p, if p rather than q is true
in the world-as-actual, and q, if q rather than p is true in the world-as-actual.
Thus a speaker of (6) or (7) can credit Bob with knowledge (or ignorance) of this
proposition, even if he himself does not know it.
Building off this, Fusco (2015) proposes we interpret bare disjunction along
similar lines: if p but not q is actually true, then p or q expresses the proposition
that p; and if q but not p is actually true, then p or q expresses the proposition that
q. The key difference between the semantic entries for pwhether p or qq above and
Fusco’s semantics for p or q concerns the cases where either both disjuncts true
or neither are: in that case, for Fusco, p or q just expresses the ordinary boolean
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disjunction p _ q.20
We can state this semantics for or in terms of a simpified answerhood operator
(Dayal, 1996, 2016). This operator takes and world w and disjuncts φ and ψ as
arguments and outputs the true-in-w answers to the question of whether φ or ψ,
if there are any. Otherwise, it outputs both answers:
Ans(w , φ, ψ) 

{φ} if w , w ,, φ and w , w ,. ψ
{ψ} if w , w ,. φ and w , w ,, ψ
{φ, ψ} otherwise.
The truth conditions for disjunction can then be given as follows:
( or ) y , x ( (φ or ψ) iff ∃α P Ans(y , φ, ψ) : y , x , α.
Figure 4 illustrates these truth conditions in matrix form. Notice that or
is, as Humberstone (2020, §4.7) puts it, a kind of two-dimensional isotope of
boolean_—that is, or and_ are equivalent along the diagonal. Thus, for diagonal
consequence, all the standard rules governing boolean disjunction hold of or . But
off the diagonal, or and _ come apart. For example, in Figure 4, w2, w3 . p or q
even though w2, w3 , p.
On this picture of disjunction, p or ¬p is like’, in that it is an a priori truth that
cannot be necessitated. (Indeed, if there are only finitely many atomics p1, . . . , pn
and all the rows of the truth table are represented by a unique world, then∧
i(pi or ¬pi) generates the same matrix as ’.) The feature of disjunction will
be responsible for nonclassical behavior in the scope of deontic modals (§ 4).
Note also that (φ or ψ) will generally not be Åqvist, even if both φ and ψ are.
Figure 5 shows how two-dimensional disjunction, like the @ operator itself, can
build non-Åqvist matrices out of the matrices for Åqvist atomics. The diagonals of
these matrices for disjunction reflect the classical profile of _: the more disjuncts
a classical disjunction has, the more states in a classical (viz., one-dimensional)
truth table it is true in.
20Groenendĳk & Stokhof’s entry presupposes that exactly one of {p , q} is true in the actual world
(op. cit. pg. 184), leaving the proposition expressed by the disjunction undefined along the bottom
row of the matrix in Figure 4. Lewis’s entry (op. cit., pg. 52) would result in a matrix with F-F-F-F
along the same row. But—to preview how the semantics will work under deontic operators like
ought (O)—this will give the wrong intuitive results for the sentences in Ross’s Puzzle and FCP.
For example, Lewis’s entry under O would entail that (4-a) is equivalent to pOˆKq in cases where a
lazy agent neither (actually) takes out the trash nor (actually) washes the dishes.
It is also worth noting the great deal of post-Groenendĳk and Stokhof 1982 work (not in a two-
dimensional tradition) on the general category of concealed questions into which (6) and (7) falls.
For developments in treating this class in inquisitive semantics, see, e.g., Roelofsen 2019.
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w1 w2 w3 w4
w1 T T T F
w2 T T F F
w3 T F T F
w4 T T T F
p or q
w1 w2 w3 w4
w1 T T T F
w2 T T T F
w3 T T T F
w4 T T T F
p _ q
Figure 4: Matrix for p or q, compared with that of p _ q, where w1 is an arbitrary
(p^ q)-world, w2 is a (p^¬q)-world, w3 is a (¬p^ q)-world, and w4 is a (¬p^¬q)-
world.
p q r
p or q q or r p or (q or r)
Figure 5: Matrices with 8 worlds per axis. Shading indicates ‘true’; white ‘false’.
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3.2 Axiomatics
What is the logic of two-dimensional or like? While some classical inference
patterns governing _ (e.g., Or-Intro) are not strictly valid for or , some are. For
instance, the following principles are still classically strictly valid evenwith Fusco’s
two-dimensional or :
Idempotence. φ ( (φ or φ)
Commutativity. φ or ψ ( ψ or φ
Associativity. φ or (ψ or χ) ( (φ or ψ) or χ21
Or-Elim. φ or ψ,¬φ ( ψ
Thus, the logic for or is not entirely divorced from the logic of_ off the diagonal.
But it does raise thequestionofwhichprinciples, exactly, are the result of projecting
from the two-dimensional or into a one-dimensional framework. So we turn to
the question of how to axiomatize our basic two-dimensional language L2D when
extended with or .
In a sense, this task is trivial; as Humberstone (2020) notes, φ or ψ on Fusco’s
semantics can be expressed using @:22
(@(φ ^ ¬ψ)Ñ φ)^ (@(¬φ ^ ψ)Ñ ψ)^ (@(φØ ψ)Ñ (φ _ ψ))
Thus, we could simply view or as a defined connective. However, this definition
is long-winded; it would be nice to know whether there are more illuminating
axioms governing or directly.
Indeed, there are. LetL2D( or ) be the result of extendingL2D with a primitive
or . Then, as noted above, we could axiomatize 2D extended with or using the
following defining axiom:
or df (p or q)Ø [(@(p ^ ¬q)Ñ p)^ (@(¬p ^ q)Ñ q)^ (@(pØ q)Ñ (p _ q))]
Alternatively, we could replace or df with the following six axioms, which more
closely mirror the standard introduction and elimination rules for disjunction:
or I1 (@p ^ p)Ñ (p or q)
or I2 (@q ^ q)Ñ (p or q)
or I3 (@¬(p _ q)^ (p _ q))Ñ (p or q)
21The validity of Associativity can be verified by cases based on which of φ, ψ, and χ is satisfied
at 〈y , y〉. We omit the proof, as it is tedious and unilluminating. Note also that the converse of
Associativity follows from Associativity and Commutativity.
22In fact, the opposite is true, too: @φ can be expressed as (φ or ¬φ)Ø φ.
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or E1 (p or q)Ñ (p _ q)
or E2 ((p or q)^@¬p)Ñ (@¬q _ q)
or E3 ((p or q)^@¬q)Ñ (@¬p _ p)
It is straightforward to show that 2D + or df is equivalent to 2D + or I1– or E3.
The latter, however, more clearly manifest the way in which the rules governing _
can be seen as one-dimensional projections from more general two-dimensional
rules governing or . Since @φ is diagonally equivalent to φ, or I1 and or I2
reduce to the standard disjunction introduction rule; or I3 diagonally follows
from explosion; or E1 is already an articulation of the disjunction elimination rule
in terms of disjunctive syllogism; and or E2 and or E3 diagonally follow from the
fact that everything implies a tautology.
Using these axioms, we can directly derive the collapse of or and _ along the
diagonal. To facilitate the reasoning, observe that the following rule is admissible
in 2D for any primitive modal operator△:
RK. If φ1, . . . , φn ( ψ, then△φ1, . . . ,△φn (△φ.
Here, then, is an axiomatic proof of◻:((φ or ψ)Ø(φ_ψ))—the apriori equivalence
of or and _ (with instances of Uniform Substitution suppressed):
1. (φ or ψ)Ñ (φ _ ψ) or E1
2. :((φ or ψ)Ñ (φ _ ψ)) Necessitation, 1
3. :(φÑ@φ) XÑ
4. :(ψÑ@ψ) XÑ
5. (@φ ^ φ)Ñ (φ or ψ) or I1
6. (@ψ ^ ψ)Ñ (φ or ψ) or I2
7. :((@φ ^ φ)Ñ (φ or ψ)) Necessitation, 5
8. :((@ψ ^ ψ)Ñ (φ or ψ)) Necessitation, 6
9. :(φÑ (φ or ψ)) RK, 3, 7
10. :(ψÑ (φ or ψ)) RK, 4, 8
11. :((φ or ψ)Ø (φ _ ψ)) RK, 2, 9, 10
12. ◻:((φ or ψ)Ø (φ _ ψ)) Necessitation, 11
This offers an axiomatic illustration of how the two-dimensional entry for or is
an isotope of the standard boolean _.
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4 Deontic Modality
4.1 Two-Dimensional Deontic Logic
Here is an interim summary of where we are. In §§ 2.1–2.2, we presented several
motivations for the two-dimensional framework as well as four notions of conse-
quence that can be distinguished within it. The axiomatization of this framework
was given in § 2.3. In § 2.4, we motivated exploring Åqvist logics with their Å-
compliant atomics. Finally, in § 3, we sketched a two-dimensional semantics of
disjunction and presented an axiomatization for it.
With this setup, we are ready to enrich the language with the deontic operators
O andM. Wedo this by enriching themodal domain of ourmatriceswith a deontic
accessibility relationRO . Thegoal of this section is to articulate the logic that results
from lifting standard one-dimensional deontic logic into two-dimensions. We then
show how doing so can solve the deontic puzzles with which we began.
First, however, we face a choice point regarding the deontic accessibility rela-
tion, similar to the choice point faced by the fully general vs. Åqvist approach to
atomics sketched in § 2.4, viz., should the deontic accessibility relation be uniform
across each row of the matrix? A ‘yes’ answer suggests that at its foundations,
deontic accessibility cannot depend on facts which are (metaphysically or epistem-
ically) indeterminate relative to the context set. A ‘no’ answer, on the other hand,
suggests that it can.
Here, we present completeness results for both paths from this choice point.
However, a number of interpretative complications arise on the latter, non-uniform
approach. (What does it mean, exactly, for deontic ideality to depend both on the
world-as-actual and theworld of evaluation?) And, at any rate, Fusco (2015) adopts
a uniform deontic accessibility relation. Since our main goal is to axiomatize this
system, we will allow uniformity to play a role in explaining Ross’s Puzzle and
(more critically) FCP. We leave it to future investigation to settle whether the
uniformity approach is warranted.
Second, there is another choice point concerning the properties of the deontic
accessibility relation. In standard one-dimensional deontic logic, it is assumed
that the deontic accessibility relation is at the very least a serial and shift-reflexive
subrelation of R◻ (generalized to the two-dimensional setting; for readability, we
leave off the world-as-actual parameter, which is held constant throughout).
May Implies Can. ∀w , v : wROv ñ wR◻v
Seriality. ∀w∃v : wROv
Shift-Reflexivity. ∀w , v : wROv ñ vROv
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These constraints correspond respectively to the following axioms (where Oˆ is
defined to be the dual of O; we separate Oˆ from M conceptually for reasons that
will be made clear in § 4.3):
MC Oˆp Ñ ◇p
DO Op Ñ Oˆp
OTO O(Op Ñ p)
AddingDO andOTO to theminimal normal modal logic results in themodal logic
KDU, i.e., “standard deontic logic+” in the terminology of McNamara 2010.
Stronger constraints could be imposed onRO , though. In particular, it is natural
to assume that RO is rigid, meaning which worlds are “deontically ideal” does not
vary from world to world:
Deontic Rigidity. ∀w , v , u : wR◻v & wROu ñ vROu
This corresponds to the following axiom:
DR OˆpÑ ◻Oˆp
On this analysis, RO effectively partitions W into the classes of deontically ideal
and nonideal worlds.23 This allows us to reduce deontic logic to alethic logic
via the standard Anderson-Kanger reduction using ◻ and a privileged atomic d
standing for pThe deontic ideals are metq (Anderson, 1958; Kanger, 1971):
Oφ B ◻(dÑ φ)
Mφ B ◇(d ^ φ)
Again, for the sake of neutrality, we present completeness results for both
options. It turns out that this option affects what we say about FCP. Because
Fusco only adopts the weaker framework, without Deontic Rigidity, she needs
to revise the relationship between O and M in order to explain FCP. Assuming
Deontic Rigidity, however, this revision is not required.
Let us now turn to the question of how to axiomatize each combination of
choices.
Definition 6. The two-dimensional deontic language LD2D is defined recursively
as follows:
φ F Prop | ¬φ | (φ ^ φ) | ◻φ | @φ | :φ | Oφ.
In addition to the other abbreviations, we define Oˆφ B ¬O¬φ.
23This is similar to the way the deontic selection function of MacFarlane and Kolodny (2010)
works. See also Kratzer 1977, 1981’s ordering-source approach.
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Definition 7. A deontic matrix frame is a tuple F  〈W ˆ W, R◻, R@, R:, RO〉,
where 〈W, R◻, R@, R:〉 is a basic matrix frame and RO is a serial, shift-reflexive
subrelation of R◻. A deontic matrix model is a pair of a deontic matrix frame
with a valuation function V : PropÑ ℘(W ˆW). A deontic matrix frame (model)
is rigid if in addition RO satisfies Deontic Rigidity. Let DM be the class of deontic
matrix models and DMR the class of rigid deontic matrix models.
Definition 8. Let D2D be the logic that results from adding MC–OTO as axioms
to 2D, and let D2DR be the result of adding DR as well.
The following is proved in § A.
Theorem 3.
(a) D2D is sound and complete for DM.
(b) D2DR is sound and complete for DMR.
Now for adding the other options.
Definition 9. LetM  〈W ˆW, R◻, R@, R:, RO ,V〉 be a deontic matrix model. Say
RO is uniform if the following condition is met for all x , y , w , v PW :
〈〈x , w〉, 〈x , v〉〉 P RO ô 〈〈y , w〉, 〈y , v〉〉 P RO .
We’ll say M is uniform if RO is. The definition of Åqvist matrix models from
Definition 4 carries over to deontic matrix models. Let DMÅU be the class of
Åqvist uniform deontic matrix models and DMÅUR the class of Åqvist, uniform,
and rigid deontic matrix models.
To state the proof system, we first need a definition.
Definition 10. A LD2D-formula is explicitly 1D if it is @-free and :-free.
Definition 11. Let F B D2DÅU be the proof system axiomatized by Modus Po-
nens, Necessitation for each primitive modal operator, Å, and the following axiom
schemas:
D2D φ, where φ is a theorem of D2D.
U OφØ :Oφ where φ is an explicitly 1D-formula.
Let FR B D2DÅUR be defined similarly except we replace D2D with:
D2DR φ, where φ is a theorem of D2DR.
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F is the proof system that axiomatizes Fusco (2015)’s semantics, while FR is the
same proof system extended with DR. The following is proved in § B.24
Theorem 4.
(a) F is sound and complete for DMÅU.
(b) FR is sound and complete for DMÅUR.
F and FR give us a pair of one-dimensional deontic logics “lifted” into two
dimensions—that is, into the space of matrices—in a way that preserves the origi-
nal, one-dimensional interpretation of atoms.25
4.2 Ross in the context of Deontic Matrix Models
Now that we’ve seen various ways of lifting deontic logic into two dimensions,
what happens when we adopt Fusco’s two-dimensional semantics for or ? As it
turns out, both Ross’s Puzzle and FCP can be accounted for (though, as we’ll see,
the latter may require a bit extra work to obtain).
Start with Ross’s Puzzle. Even in FR, the Ross inference is not a priori valid:
Op 6▷DMÅUR O(p or q). A counterexample is given in Figure 6. Let us say a modelM a priori satisfies φ, written M ▷ φ, if M , z , z , φ for all z P W . (Thus,
Γ ▷C φ iff for every M P C, if M ▷ Γ, then M ▷ φ.) The deontic matrix model
in Figure 6 a priori satisfies the premise Op. But it fails to a priori satisfy the
conclusion O(p or q). The witness for this failure is 〈wq , wq〉: at 〈wq , wq〉, the
disjunction p or q expresses the proposition that q. But q is not obligatory (or even
permissible) at 〈wq , wq〉.
To get a better sense of why failures of the Ross inference arise, it helps to
contrast this counterexample with a model where O(p or q) is a priori satisfied,
such as in Figure 7. We can see that q—the actually true answer to pp, or q?q in
wq—is obligatory from the point of view of 〈wq , wq〉.26 We can also see that p—the
actually true answer to pp, or q?q in wp—is obligatory from the point of view of
〈wp , wp〉, the other diagonal, or ‘a priori’, point in the model. If it is q which the
agent actually does—settling that she is at the diagonal point on the second row
of the matrix—then it is q she ought to do. But the reverse is true if it is p which
she actually does. Since the choice of actuality is up to her, what is deontically
24An anonymous reviewer asks whether consequence over DMU can be axiomatized by just
adding U to D2D. Alternatively, one might conjecture that we can drop Å from F. The answer is
negative on both counts, since U is not sound for the class of (even rigid) uniform deontic matrix
models that are not Åqvist. A counterexample is given in § B (Figure 11).
25These logics hence preserve the one-dimensional notion of “good arguments” from Gregory
2001 and Williamson 2013 (glossed in footnote 19).






Figure 6: A counterexample to Ross’s Puzzle in FR, where for any α, β, γ P Prop,
〈wβ , wγ〉 P V(α) iff γ  α.





Figure 7: A model where O(p or q) is a priori satisfied.
4.3 Permissibility and Free Choice Permission
Let’s turn now to FCP. Before we explain how two-dimensional deontic logic
captures this principle, we add a qualification. The FCP inference seems to be
licensed for both disjuncts only when it’s possible for the agent to make each
disjunct true without the other. For instance, suppose you are told you may take
27It is worth noting that a proposal for understanding FCP which is similar in spirit but quite
different in implementation to the present approach, is independently developed in the linguistics
literature by Kaufmann (2016). Unfortunately, we lack the space to compare the similarities and
differences of the views at length here.
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an apple or a pear, but it turns out (say, for practical reasons) that you can only
take the pear if you also take the apple. In that case, it seems as though you are
not, in general, permitted to take the pear. In light of this, the form of free choice
we will be interested in makes explicit that it’s possible for each disjunct to be true
without the other:28
FCP*. M(φ or ψ),◇(φ ^ ¬ψ),◇(ψ ^ ¬φ) ( Mφ ^Mψ
We’ll start with deontically rigid models, since the explanation of FCP* over
this class is simpler. Three ingredients are required. First, M is the dual of O,
i.e., M B Oˆ. Second, the deontic accessibility relation is uniform. And third, the
formulas involved in the inference are Åqvist, i.e., their propositional content does
not vary with the world-as-actual. Thus, where the Å operator is defined as in
§ 2.4, we have the following free choice theorem:29 , 30
Theorem 5. M(φ or ψ),◇(φ ^ ¬ψ),Åφ,Åψ ▷DMÅUR Mφ.
Proof. LetM be a Åqvist, uniform, and rigid deontic matrix model such that:
(i) M ▷ M(φ or ψ)
(ii) M ▷ ◇(φ ^ ¬ψ)
(iii) M ▷ Åφ ^ Åψ
Let w P W ; we will show that M , w , w , Mφ. By (ii), there exists a v P W such
that M , w , v , φ ^ ¬ψ. By (iii), M , w , v , φ ^ ¬ψ iff M , w , v , :φ ^ ¬:ψ,
which holds iff M , v , v , φ ^ ¬ψ. Hence, Ans(v , φ, ψ)  {φ}. By (i), M , v , v ,
M(φ or ψ). So there exists a u PW such that 〈v , v〉RO 〈v , u〉 andM , v , u , φ or ψ.
Since Ans(v , φ, ψ)  {φ}, that means M , v , u , φ. By (iii), M , w , u , φ. But
because RO is uniform, 〈w , v〉RO 〈w , u〉. And because RO is rigid, that means
〈w , w〉RO 〈w , u〉. Hence,M , w , w , Mφ. 
28Empirical data suggests these this caveat is connected to the exclusivity data from footnote 1,
especially in the case where there are more than two disjuncts. In the simplest case, suppose
that for the disjunction pp1 or p2 or . . . or pnq it holds that ◻(pi Ą pi+1). Then it is impossible
to make p1 true without making
∧
i pi true. In this case, FCP, but not FCP, would hold that
M(p1 or . . . or pn) entails M(∧i pi), contrary to EX from footnote 1. Recent experimental work
suggests this entailment is not licensed in these cases (Fusco, 2020a).
29In fact, Theorem 5 holds even for the class of uniform and rigid deontic matrix models—that
is, we don’t have to require valuations to be Åqvist. But the completeness proof of F(R) requires
the deontic matrix models be Åqvist, so we’ve stated the theorem in terms of Åqvist models.
30An anonymous reviewer points out that ▷DMÅUR may be too strong to plausibly formalize
natural language entailment. For instance, p ▷DMÅUR Op and p ▷DMÅUR ◻p. This is because the
atoms are Åqvist, so if they’re true at every diagonal, they’re true everywhere. (More generally,
φ,Åφ ▷DM ◻φ and φ,Åφ ▷DM Oφ.) This is related to the “If p, Ought p” problem, which
information-sensitive theories of ‘ought’ tend to face. See Carr 2014 for discussion. We do not
propose a solution to this problem, though we suspect it will require a better understanding of
how conditionals relate to disjunction (observe, e.g., that 6▷DMÅUR ¬p or Op).
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We can illustrate this using by contrasting Figure 8 and Figure 6. In Figure 8,
M(p or q) is a priori satisfied because no matter which world is actual, the actual
answer to pp, or q?q is permissible. By contrast, in Figure 6, q is not permissible,




Figure 8: M ▷ M(p or q)
The addition of premises Åφ and Åψ is new relative to Fusco 2015. There,
Fusco states the free choice inference (using our notation) as:
M(φ or ψ),◇(φ ^ ¬ψ),◇(¬φ ^ ψ) ▷ Mφ ^Mψ
where φ and ψ are both disjunction-free and non-modal. In that framework, Fusco
implicitly assumes that all atomics areÅqvist, which entails that any such formulas
are Åqvist. Thus, our theorem is a generalization of Fusco’s result: her free choice
inference can be extended to any φ and ψ so long as their content does not vary
from row-to-row.
There are cases involving non-Åqvist disjuncts, however, where free choice
does not hold in this semantics. Here is a counterexample. Our matrix modelM
will consist of four worlds wpq , wp¯q , wpq¯ , wp¯ q¯ . Our (Åqvist) valuation will be the
obvious one:
〈wαβ , wγδ〉 P V(p) ô γ  p
〈wαβ , wγδ〉 P V(q) ô δ  q.
The deontic accessibility relation will say all and only p¯-worlds are deontically
ideal:
〈wαβ , wγδ〉RO 〈wαβ , wγ1δ1〉 ô γ1  p¯
Note, RO is both uniform and rigid. This model is summarized in Figure 9.
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Figure 9: Counterexample to free choice with non-Åqvist disjuncts. The diagram
on the right is a visualization of the accessibility relations on each row.
Then letting φ  @pØ p and ψ  @qØ q, we have:31
M ▷ M((@pØ p) or (@qØ q))
M ▷ ◇((@pØ p)^ ¬(@qØ q))
M ▷ ◇(¬(@pØ p)^ (@qØ q))
M 6▷ M(@pØ p)
Thus, FCP* does not hold for all non-Åqvist cases in Fusco’s semantics.
With that said, we think this is not a serious cost to Fusco’s approach, for two
reasons. First, these sorts of counterexamples are quite strange. It is hard to see
how we could have robust and reliable intuitions about their analogues in natural
language. This is especially complicated by evidence that the actually operator
@ is not be an adequate formalization of the English word ‘actually’.32 So these
consequences of Fusco’s semantics would likely be hard to test empirically.
Second, there is an alternative formulation of free choice available that avoids
31To seewhy, note that for each v PW ,Ans(v ,@pØp ,@qØq)  {@pØp ,@qØq}. This is because
@φØ φ is a diagonal validity. Thus, for each v PW , we haveM , v , v , M((@pØ p) or (@qØ q))
iff ∃δ P {q , q¯} : M , v , wp¯δ , (@pØ p)_ (@qØ q). It is easily verified this holds for all v, since some
deontically idealworld agreeswith v on q. Moreover, the possibility premises are satisfied on every
row, since every combination of truth values to p and q is realized. But whileM ▷ M(@qØ q), we
do not have M(@pØ p) satisfied at every diagonal point. Specifically,M , wpq , wpq . M(@pØ p)
andM , wpq¯ , wpq¯ . M(@pØ p).
32For data showing that English ‘actually’ is more complex, see Yalcin (2015).
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these complications. We can drop the premises Åφ and Åψ from the inference so
long as we diagonalize the disjuncts first.
Theorem 6. M(:φ or :ψ),◇(:φ ^ ¬:ψ) ▷DMÅUR M:φ
Proof. Immediate from Theorem 5 and the fact that (DM Å:φ. 
In fact, Theorem 5 can be seen as a special instance of this more general principle,
sinceÅφ ( ◻(φØ:φ). We often diagonalizematerial in the scope ofmodals as part
of a broader reinterpretation strategy. For instance, while (8) is not metaphysically
necessary, and thus (9) is false so-interpreted, there does seem to be a reading of
(9) on which it is true, viz., one where the flavor of necessity is a priority.
(8) I am here now.
(9) Necessarily, I am here now.
a. False: ◻(I am here now)
b. True: ◻:(I am here now)
It would therefore be unsurprising if diagonalization occurred in the scope of
disjunction, given that disjunction is itself interpreted as a kind of binary modal.
This concludes the explanation of free choice when the accessibility relation is
deontically rigid. Let us now turn to the case where it is not. In fact, Fusco (2015)
does not endorse deontic rigidity because of cases like the following:
Choosing Childbearing. You face a choice between conceiving a child
early in your life [ p] or a different child significantly later [ q].
You believe that your values will be transformed by the choice you
make. In particular, because the choice you make will be a necessary
condition for the existence of a person youwill love, youwill affirm that
choice over any other. There is no single psychological standpoint that
values both of these potential persons to equal degree. (Parfit, 1984,
pg. 360–361; Paul, 2014, Ch. 3; Paul, 2015.)
Nice Choices at the Spa. Aromatherapy [ p] or body-wrap [ q]—
which is it to be? You believe that, whichever you choose, you will be
very glad you chose it. Mid-aromatherapy, the aromatherapywill seem
self-evidently superior [to the body-wrap]. Mid-body-wrap, the body-
wrap will seem self-evidently superior [to the aromatherapy]. (Hare
and Hedden, 2016, pg. 3)
Suppose “nice choices” like the ones described above are possible. Then worlds
where the agent makes different choices may have different deontic points of view.






Figure 10: A one-dimensional nice choice
To accommodate free choice inferences in this more general framework, Fusco
proposes to capture FCP* by reconceiving of the connection between obligation
and permission. In brief, where the standard view is thatM is just Oˆ, i.e., the dual
ofO, Fusco proposes to analyzeM in terms of a weaker condition, viz.,◇Oˆ. Thus,
the revised truth conditions for M are as follows:
(M2) y , x , Mφ iff there is some x1 such that x1ROx1 and y , x1 , φ
Redefining M in this way, we obtain free choice once again:
Theorem 7. Where M B ◇Oˆ:
(a) M(φ or ψ),◇(φ ^ ¬ψ),Åφ,Åψ ▷DMÅU Mφ
(b) M(:φ or :ψ),◇(:φ ^ ¬:ψ) ▷DMÅU M:φ
Proof. The proof of (a) is the same as that of Theorem5up towherewe inferred that
M , v , v , M(φ or ψ). From there, it follows that there exists a u PW such that for
some u1 P W , 〈v , u〉RO 〈v , u1〉 and M , v , u1 , φ or ψ. Since Ans(v , φ, ψ)  {φ},
that means M , v , u1 , φ. By (iii), M , w , u1 , φ. But because RO is uniform,
〈w , u〉RO 〈w , u1〉. Hence,M , w , u , Oˆφ. SoM , w , w , ◇Oˆφ  Mφ. The proof of
(b) is immediate as before. 
Thus, one does not need to commit oneself to the claim that eachworldmust agree
with every other about which worlds are deontically ideal in order to capture free
choice, so long as we take a revisionary stance on the relationship between ‘may’
and ‘ought’.
Note that, in deontically rigid models, this definition of M is equivalent to Oˆ:
Theorem 8. (DMR OˆφØ◇Oˆφ.
Thus, one could in principle adopt this definition (M B ◇Oˆ) in FR as well; it’s
just that doing so would not be a genuine departure from the orthodox view that
‘may’ is the dual of ‘ought’.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we explored several ways of axiomatizing ◻, :, @, and the deontic
operators O and M, with an eye to FCP and Ross’s Puzzle, following the path
sketched by Fusco (2015, 2019). The language also provides a way of connecting
the apriori (A) operator to Stalnaker’s “Assertion”, via the idea that a natural notion
of global or informational consequence is in fact a diagonalized one as well. We
axiomatized Fusco’s logic of disjunction using rules that collapse into the standard
disjunction introduction/elimination rules in the one-dimensional setting. We
then explored several different formulations of two-dimensional deontic logic and
how these different choice points relate to the deontic puzzles in § 1.
While our focus has primarily been ondeontic logic, the various choice points in
§ 4 highlight a broader lesson for the study of two-dimensional logics. When lifting
a one-dimensional system into two dimensions, one needs to keep in perspective
the originalmotivations for doing so. For some applications, itwill be desirable not
to impose uniformity on accessibility relations, thus preserving the full generality
of the two-dimensional framework. But for other applications to natural language,
especially in the context of a Stalnakerian picture of assertion, uniformity may be
motivated by more than mere convenience. We leave further discussion of these
issues for another time.
A Axiomatizing D2D
In this appendix, we prove Theorem 3: D2D(R) is sound and complete for the
class DM(R) of (rigid) deontic matrix models. The proof is an extension of the
completeness results in Fritz 2014; Fusco 2020b for two-dimensional languages
without deontic operators. Below, we have omitted the proofs of all the “Facts”,
as they can be found in Fusco 2020b (or are straightforward extensions of facts
therein).
The proof strategy is in three steps. We identify three classes of frames:
1. FrD2D(R), the class of D2D(R)-frames;
2. RD(R), an intermediate class of (rigid) deontic Restall frames;
3. MFD(R), the class of (rigid) deontic matrix frames.
The first step is to establish the soundness and completeness of D2D(R) over
FrD2D(R). This follows immediately from Sahlqvist’s theorem, since all the axioms
are Sahlqvist formulas.33
33In fact, as an anonymous reviewer notes, this is the only place where we appeal to DO and
OTO . Thus, the proof strategy generalizes to any set of axioms governing O that are canonical in
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Theorem 9. D2D(R) is sound and strongly complete with respect to FrD2D(R).
Proof. By Sahlqvist’s Theorem (Blackburn et al., 2002, Ch. 4). 
The second step is to show that FrD2D(R) is modally equivalent to an intermediate
class of frames RD(R), viz., (rigid) deontic Restall frames. This is established by
showing that RD(R) is the class of point-generated subframes of FrD2D(R). The
final step is then to show that every deontic Restall frame is equivalent to a matrix
frameby showinghow to construct a boundedmorphism froman arbitrary deontic
Restall frame into a deontic matrix frame.
FrD2D(R) RD(R) MFD(R)
gen. submodel bounded morphism
We start with some facts about D2D, which are all left as an exercise to the
reader:







In addition, the following is provable in D2D:
@5Oˆ Oˆ@φÑ@φ
Definition 12. A Kripke frame is a tuple F  〈W, R◻, R@, R:, RO〉 where W is a
set of points and each R△ is a binary relation onW .
Fact 2. The axioms of D2D(R) have the following (global) first-order correspon-
dents in Kripke frames:
T◻ R◻ is reflexive
5◻ R◻ is Euclidean
@5◇ ∀w , v , u :
(wR◻v & wR@u)ñ vR@u
G R@ Ď R◻
R@ R@ is a function
R: R: is a function
XÑ ∀w , v , u :
the sense of Blackburn et al. 2002, p. 206. However, the same is not true for the proof of Theorem 4
in § B (since RYO may not satisfy the appropriate constraints).
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(wR:v & vR@u)ñ v  u YÑ ∀w , v , u :
(wR@v & vR:u)ñ v  u
4A R◻ ˝ R: is transitive
5A ∀x , y , a , b :
(xR◻y & xR◻a & aR:b)ñ
∃c(bR◻c & ∀d(cR:d ñ yR:d))
MC RO Ď R◻
DO RO is serial
UO RO is shift-reflexive
DR ∀w , v , u :
(wR◻v & wROu)ñ vROu
The correspondents for X and Y in Fact 1 are as follows:
X Within Img(R:), R@ is the identity relation
Y Within Img(R@), R: is the identity relation
The following facts hold of any D2D-frame:
Fact 3. Img(R@)  Img(R:).
Fact 4. ∀d1, d2 P Img(R@): if d1(R◻ ˝ R:)d2, then d2(R◻ ˝ R:)d1.
Fact 5. R◻ ˝ R: an equivalence relation on Img(R@).
Fact 6. Suppose wR@d1 and wR:d2. Then ∃w1 s.t. w1R@d2 and w1R:d1.
Before we show FrD2D(R) is modally equivalent to RD(R), it will help to prove the
following lemma. (Notation: if R△ is a function, we use “R△(x)” for the unique y
such that xR△y)
Lemma 1. For any point-generated subframe Fw  〈W 1, R1◻, R1:, R1@, R1O〉 P FrD2D:
W 1  R◻[R:[R◻[{w}]]].
Proof. We let X B R◻[R:[R◻[{w}]]]. It suffices to show (1) w P X and (2) that for
each operator O that RO[X] Ď X. These are proven in Fusco 2020b except for the
O case for (2), which is easy since RO Ď R◻ and we have T◻. 
Definition 13. A (rigid) deontic Restall Frame is a frame R  〈W, R◻, R@, R:, RO〉
such that
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1. R◻ is an equivalence relation
2. R@ is a function such that
(a) wR@v Ñ wR◻v
(b) R@ maps any two R◻-related worlds to the same point
3. R: is a function such that:
(a) for any w: R:[R◻[{w}]]  Img(R@)
(b) R: is reflexive over Img(R@)
4. RO is a (rigid,) serial, shift-reflexive subrelation of R◻.
Let RD(R) be the class of (rigid) deontic Restall frames.
Lemma 2. RD(R) Ă FrD2D(R).
Proof. To verify this, it suffices to go through the first-order correspondents of
D2D(R) from Fact 2. 
Lemma3. Everypoint-generated subframeFw P FrD2D(R) is a (rigid) deontic Restall
frame.
Proof. Where Fw  〈W 1, R1@, R1:, R1◻, R1O〉 is a w-generated subframe in FrD2D, let
v be an arbitrarily chosen world in W 1. We want to establish that Fw satisfies
conditions 1–4 of deontic Restall frames. Conditions 1–3 are established in Fusco
2020b. Condition 4 follows from the correspondences in Fact 2.

Theorem 10. FrD2D(R) and RD(R) are modally equivalent.
Proof. By Lemma 2, any formula falsifiable in R P RD(R) is falsifiable in some
F P FrD2D(R). By Lemma 3, any formula falsifiable in a point-generated subframe
Fw P FrD2D(R) is falsifiable in some R P RD(R). But any formula falsifiable in a
F P FrD2D(R) is falsifiable in a point-generated subframe (Blackburn et al., 2002,
Proposition 2.6.). 
Now we just need to reduce RD(R) toMFD(R). Some notation:
• We write R[Y] for the image of a set Y under R.
• Let D  Img(R@). We will use i , j . . . as indices over D.
• Where R is a deontic Restall frame, let C be the set of R◻-cells in R. Since
there is one d P D in each such cell, C is the cardinality of D.
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Fact 7. ⋃iPD ci W .
Fact 8. There is a unique R@-fixed point in each R◻-cell ci ĂW .
Notation: call this R@-fixed point R@(ci).
Fact 9. For any w and any c j ĎW , ∃!v P c j s.t. wR:v.
More notation: where ci P C, let c ji be the set {w P ci | ∃v P c j : wR:v}. Let R:(c ji )
be the unique v P c j such that ∀w P c ji , wR:v. That R:(c ji ) is a fixed point of R:
follows from Red:.
Corollary 1. Each ci can be partitioned into {c ji | j P D}, where c
j
i is a nonempty




i  ci , and
⋃
iPD(⋃ jPD c ji ) 
W .
Theorem 11. RD(R) andMFD(R) are modally equivalent.
Proof. Since MFD(R) Ă RD(R), every (rigid) deontic matrix frame is equivalent to
some (rigid)deonticRestall frame. For the converse, givenadeonticRestall frameR
with domainW and Img(R@)  D, we will build a matrix frameM and construct,
row-by-row, a surjective bounded morphism f from M to R, from which modal
equivalence follows (Blackburn et al., 2002, Proposition 2.14).
The points of our matrix frameM will be (D ˆW)ˆ (D ˆW). For any i , j P D
and y PW , let A ji ,y be the set {〈i , y〉} ˆ {〈 j, x〉 : x PW}. Note that |A
j
i ,y |  |W |.
For each i , j P D and y P W , fix some surjective g ji ,y : W Ñ c
j
i such that if i  j
and y  x, then g ji ,y(x)  R@(ci). (This condition maps the “diagonal” points of
the matrix frame into D in the deontic Restall frame.) We know such surjective
functions exist since |A ji ,y | ě |c
j
i |.
The accessibility relations RM◻ , RM@ , and RM: are already determined by the
definition of a deontic matrix frame. To define RMO , first define a function F : (D ˆ
W)ˆ (D ˆW)ÑW as follows: F(〈〈i , y〉, 〈 j, x〉〉)  g ji ,y(x). We define RMO in terms
of F:
〈〈i , y〉, 〈 j, x〉〉RMO 〈〈i , y〉, 〈 j1, x1〉〉 ô F(〈〈i , y〉, 〈 j, x〉〉)ROF(〈〈i , y〉, 〈 j1, x1〉〉).
Wewill now show that F is a bounded morphism fromM to R.34 To do this, it
34F is a bounded morphism if it satisfies the following conditions for each △ P {◻,@, :,O}
(Blackburn et al., 2002, pg. 59):
1. w and F(w) satisfy the same proposition letters;
2. if wRM△v then F(w)R△F(v) (the Forth condition);
3. if F(w)R△v1 then there exists some v such that wRM△v and F(v)  v1 (the Back condition).
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suffices to go through the Back and Forth conditions for△ P {◻,@, :,O} for each
point. The only new case not in the proof from Fusco 2020b is the O case.
(O, Forth) Immediate by the definition of RMO .
(O, Back) Suppose F(〈〈i , y〉, 〈 j, x〉〉)ROv1. We want to show that there is some
〈〈i , y〉, 〈 j1, x1〉〉 such that 〈〈i , y〉, 〈 j, x〉〉RXO 〈〈i , y〉, 〈 j1, x1〉〉 and also that
F(〈〈i , y〉, 〈 j1, x1〉〉)  v1. To witness this existential, we can choose any
〈〈i , y〉, 〈 j1, x1〉〉 such that F(〈〈i , y〉, 〈 j1, x1〉〉)  v1 (we know one exists
since F is surjective).
Hence, F is a bounded morphism, and soM is modally equivalent to R. 
B Axiomatizing Deontic Åqvist Logic
In this appendix, we prove Theorem 4: F is sound and complete for the class of
Åqvist uniform deontic matrix models DMÅU. (The proof that FR is sound and
complete for DMÅUR is analogous.) Soundness is straightforward and left to the
reader. For completeness, the strategy will be to bootstrap off the completeness
result for D2D in § A.
First, we need to prove some lemmas about the expressive power ofD2D.
Lemma 4. For any LD2D-formula φ, the following formulas are strictly valid over
DM:
(a) ◻(@φ _ ψ)Ø (@φ _ ◻ψ)
(b) O(@φ _ ψ)Ø (@φ _ Oψ).
Recall the definition of explicitly 1D formulas (Definition 10).
Lemma 5. For any deontic matrix model M  〈W ˆ W, R◻, R@, R:, RO ,V〉, if
M satisfies Å and U everywhere, then for any w , w1, v P W , any explicitly 1D
LD2D-formula φ:
M , w , v , φ ô M , w1, v , φ.
Proof. By induction. 
Definition 14. An @-atom is a LD2D-formula that is either explicitly 1D, or is of
the form @φ where φ is explicitly 1D.
The following is an extension of a result for languages without : or O proven in
Hazen et al. 2013:
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Lemma 6. Every LD2D-formula is strictly equivalent to a boolean combination of
@-atoms over DMÅU.
Proof. By induction on the structure of LD2D-formulas. Throughout, we’ll use
“φ ” ψ” to mean φ and ψ are strictly equivalent over DMÅU. The atomic and
boolean cases are trivial. We’ll present the other cases. Assume for inductive







where each αi , j is an @-atom.
(◻) Since ◻ commutes with conjunction:










So it suffices to show that each ◻∨nij1 αi , j is equivalent to a boolean combi-
nation of @-atoms. First, write
∨ni
j1 αi , j as:
@βi ,1 _ ¨ ¨ ¨ _@βi ,m _ γi ,m+1 _ ¨ ¨ ¨ _ γi , j
where each βi ,x and γi ,y are explicitly 1D. Then by Lemma 4(a):
◻ ni∨
j1
αi , j ” ◻(@βi ,1 _ ¨ ¨ ¨ _@βi ,m _ γi ,m+1 _ ¨ ¨ ¨ _ γi , j)
” @βi ,1 _ ¨ ¨ ¨ _@βi ,m _ ◻(γi ,m+1 _ ¨ ¨ ¨ _ γi , j)
But now all these terms are @-atoms.
(O) Similar to the (◻) case.












Now, either αi , j is explicitly 1D, in which case @αi , j is an @-atom, or αi , j 
@βi , j where βi , j is explicitly 1D, in which case @αi , j ” @@βi , j ” @βi , j ”
αi , j , so we can replace @αi , j with αi , j . The result is therefore a boolean
combination of @-atoms.
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Now, either αi , j is explicitly 1Dor αi , j  @βi , j where βi , j is explicitly 1D. In the
former case, :αi , j ” αi , j by Lemma 5. In the latter case, :αi , j ” :@βi , j ” :βi , j ,
which is equivalent to βi , j by Lemma 5 again. So either way, :αi , j ” αi , j ,
which means φ is strictly equivalent to :φ already.

Theorem 12. F is sound and complete for DMÅU.
Proof. Let Γ be a F-consistent set of formulas. Take a maximal F-consistent exten-
sion Γ+ Ě Γ (the proof that one exists is standard). By Theorem 3, there is a deontic
matrix model M and some y , x P W such that M , y , x , Γ+. We first show that
the valuation V is already Åqvist. Then we show how to transform M into an
equivalent model whose deontic accessibility relation is uniform.
First, V is Åqvist: since ◻:◻(p Ø :p) P Γ+ for all p P Prop, it follows that
M , w , v , pØ :p for all w , v P X. Henec, for all w , w1, v P X:
〈w , v〉 P V(p) ô M , w , v , p
ô M , w , v , :p
ô M , v , v , p
ô M , w1, v , :p
ô M , w1, v , p
ô 〈w1, v〉 P V(p).
Next, we show how to transform M into an equivalent one whose deontic
accessibility relation is uniform. Define RYO as follows:
〈w , v〉RYO 〈w , u〉 ô ∃z : 〈z , v〉RO 〈z , u〉
Define MY  〈W ˆ W, R◻, R@, R:, RYO ,V〉. Clearly, RYO is uniform, serial, and
shift-reflexive. (Note also that if RO is rigid, so is RYO .)
Lemma 7. For all w , v PW and all explicitly 1D LD2D-formulas φ:
M , w , v , φ ô MY, w , v , φ.
Proof. By induction on the complexity of φ. We only present theO case (the others
are straightforward). Suppose for inductive hypothesis that the claim holds of φ.
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Clearly, ifMY, w , v , Oφ, thenM , w , v , Oφ since RO Ď RYO . So we just need to
establish the converse.
Suppose MY, w , v . Oφ. Thus, for some u P W , we have 〈w , v〉RYO 〈w , u〉
and MY, w , u . φ. By definition of RYO , for some z P W , 〈z , v〉RO 〈z , u〉. And
by inductive hypothesis, M , w , u . φ. Hence, by Lemma 5, M , z , u . φ. So
M , z , v . Oφ. But again by Lemma 5,M , w , v . Oφ. 
Lemma 8. For all w , v PW and all @-atoms φ:
M , w , v , φ ô MY, w , v , φ.
Proof. If φ is an explicitly 1D LD2D-formula, then this is ensured by Lemma 7. If
φ  @ψ where ψ is explicitly 1D, then:
M , w , v , @ψ ô M , w , w , ψ
ô MY, w , w , ψ (Lemma 7)
ô MY, w , v , @ψ.

Hence, by Lemma 6, for any LD2D-formula φ and any w , v P W : M , w , v , φ iff
MY, w , v , φ. SoMY, y , x , Γ+. 
Note that one cannot axiomatize consequence over DMU simply by droppingÅ
from the axiomatization. The inductive step for O in the proof of Lemma 7 relies
on Lemma 5, which in turn relies on the Å axiom for the base case. This use of
Å is ineliminable: for U is not valid over the general class of (even rigid) uniform
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